Abstract. In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on noncausal explanations in philosophy of sciences. I will first present examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences. Then, I will outline three alternative approaches to non-causal explanations -that is, causal reductionism, pluralism and monism -and, corresponding to these three approaches, different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non-causal explanation.
Introduction
The question "what is a scientific explanation?" has taken center stage in modern philosophy of science, from its beginnings in the early 20 th century until the present day. For the past three decades, causal accounts of scientific explanations have been the dominant view and the detailed philosophical analysis of causal explanations, and also of causation itself, have been the main focus in the philosophy of scientific explanation. According to causal accounts, the sciences explain by identifying the causes of and mechanisms for the phenomenon to be explained (see, for instance, Salmon 1984 Salmon , 1989  The existence of non-causal explanations creates a challenge to causal accounts. Let me clarify how the challenge arises by distinguishing two attitudes towards causal accounts of explanation -the weak and the strong attitude. For many proponents of causal accounts, however, it remains unclear which of the two attitudes they adopt.
• Strong attitude: Suppose one takes causal accounts to be general accounts of scientific explanation. That is, one takes causal accounts to My main point is that, independently of whether one favors the strong or the weak attitude towards causal accounts of explanations, the existence of noncausal explanations in science requires a philosophical response. One has to develop a theory of explanation capturing non-causal explanations -either by replacing or by complementing causal accounts of explanation.
The goal of this paper is to present the gist of the exciting new literature on non-causal explanations. In the recent literature, the primary goal of discussing examples of non-causal explanations has been to undermine or challenge the hegemony of causal accounts. The current debate has been largely silent on a more positive and constructive approach to non-causal explanation. In this paper, I will also advocate the view that in order to advance a constructive approach one should address (some of) the questions I will present in this paper.
Of course, due to space constraints, I will not be able to address some deeply interesting issues regarding non-causal explanations, such as whether non-causal modes of explaining are superior to garden variety causal explanations (Andersen forthcoming), whether there is a special relationship that non-causal explanations bear to certain kinds of idealizations (Batterman and Rice 2014) , and which role the pragmatics of explanation play in the noncausal case (Potochnik in progress).
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, I will provide an overview of the examples motivating the claim that there are non-causal explanations. In section 3, I will present three major approaches to non-causal explanations (causal reductionism, pluralism, and monism) and, respectively, different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non-causal explanations. Section 4 will provide an outlook on open research questions.
Examples of Non-Causal Explanations
Let me present three prominent examples of non-causal explanations in more detail: (1) Lange's explanation, (2) Euler's explanation, and (3) renormalization group explanations. I will, then, present a more encompassing list of examples that are being discussed in the current literature.
Example 1: Lange's explanation. Let me start with a simple and instructive toy example from Lange's recent work (Lange 2013: 488 understood as causal explanations. Lewis (1986) (1) and (2) The perhaps most prominent heir of Salmon's and van Fraassen's 4 Salmon's story about the friendly physicist also has another intended upshot: one may have a causal and a non-causal explanation for the same phenomenon and both explanations are equally valuable. This is also a form of pluralism (or relativism). However, for present concerns, I am exclusively interested in pluralism as defined above. Pluralism, if understood in this way, is compatible with (but does not imply) the view that one phenomenon has a causal and an equally valuable non-causal explanation. See Pincock (in progress) for instructive definitions of different kinds of pluralism.
pluralist approaches in the recent debate on non-causal explanations seems to be Lange's account of "explanation by constraint" (Lange 2011 (Lange , 2013 progress; for an alternative pluralist framework, see Pincock in progress).
Lange ( other non-causal explanations as follows:
"Ultimately, I argue that these explanations explain not by describing the world's causal structure, but roughly by revealing that the explanandum is more necessary than ordinary causal laws are. The Königsberg bridges as so arranged were never crossed because they cannot be crossed. Mother's strawberries were not distributed evenly among her children because they cannot be." (Lange 2013: 491) What does this "cannot" amount to? Lange proposes to explicate his modal account in terms of different strengths of necessities:
"These necessities are stronger than causal necessity, setting distinctively mathematical explanations apart from ordinary scientific explanations. Distinctively mathematical explanations in science work by appealing to facts […] that are modally stronger than ordinary causal laws […] ." (Lange 2013: 491) The modal approach provides Lange with a prima facie helpful criterion to distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations in terms of modal strength: an explanation is non-causal if its explanatory principles refer to "necessities [that] are stronger than causal necessity" (Lange 2013: 491) .
Lange is a pluralist, because he agrees with Salmon that (1) some explanations fall under the "ontic" causal account, while some (but not necessarily all) non-causal explanations are subsumed under the "modal" account, and (2) there is no overarching, more general account of explanation covering all of these explanations. Lange summarizes: "I have argued that the modal conception, properly elaborated, applies at least to distinctively mathematical explanation in science, whereas the ontic conception does not." (Lange 2013: 509-510) This, I take it, is an instance of pluralism.
(c) Monism, i.e. the view that there is one single philosophical account capturing both causal and non-causal explanations. A monist holds that causal and non-causal explanations share a feature that makes them explanatory.
Unlike the causal reductionist, the monist does not deny the existence of noncausal explanations. The monist disagrees with the pluralist, because the former wishes to replace the causal account with some monist account, while the latter merely wants to supplement the causal account.
What might a monist account look like? Hempel's covering-law account may serve as an instructive historical example for illustrating monism (Hempel 1965: 352) . Hempel argues that causal and non-causal explanations are explanatory by virtue of having one single feature in common: nomic expectability. In the case of causal explanations, one expects the explanandum to occur on the basis of causal covering laws (laws of succession) and intitial conditions; in the non-causal case, one's expectations are based on non-causal covering laws (laws of coexistence) and initial conditions. However, Hempelian monism is unfortunately not the most attractive option for monists, because the covering-law account suffers from well-known problems (Salmon 1989: 46-50) . 
Open Questions for Future Research
Since the debate on non-causal explanations in its current form is a fairly young field and no established literature, (luckily) no 'received view', has emerged yet, I will use this section to articulate three potentially fruitful questions for future research.
(1) How does one adequately distinguish between causal and non-causal 6 Strevens explores an alternative monist approach. Strevens has argued for extending the notion of difference-making figuring in his kairetic account of explanation from causal to non-causal explanations (Strevens 2008: 177-180) . However, Strevens' monism has a different scope than the monism advocated by proponents of the counterfactual account. Although Strevens argues for causal reductionism with respect to some allegedly non-causal scientific explanations, he holds that there are extra-scientific non-causal explanations (such as explanations in pure mathematics, moral explanations, and metaphysical explanations). If one extends the kairetic account from causal scientific to non-causal extra-scientific explanations, then the central notion of difference-making is based on, for instance, moral and mathematical dependence relations. Interestingly, Strevens' view also has pluralist aspects, because the causal, moral, and mathematical dependence relations figuring in scientific, moral, and mathematical explanations are taken as primitives. I believe Strevens' interesting approach deserves more attention.
explanations?
Causal reductionism, pluralism and monism suggest different strategies for characterizing causal explanations and for distinguishing causal and noncausal explanations. But are these proposals convincing?
Lewis' and Skow's weakened causal account comes with a price, since their notion of "information" is at odds with major theories of causation and of The popularity of causal accounts of explanation has been mainly due to the fact that they successfully meet desiderata that are not satisfied by previously proposed alternative accounts of explanation -most importantly, the coveringlaw account (Hempel 1965) . Famously, the covering-law account fails, among other issues, to identify (a) some explanatory asymmetries, and ( Currently, one finds a strikingly common theme in philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics: an increasing attention to noncausal explanations. In addition to non-causal explanations in the sciences, there seem to be plausible instances of non-causal explanations in pure mathematics and in metaphysics. Philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians distinguish between non-causally explanatory and non-explanatory proofs in pure mathematics (Mancosu 2015; Colyvan et al. in progress) . Metaphysicians adopt the view that if A-facts ground B-facts, then the A-facts explain non-causally why B-facts obtain (Reutlinger forthcoming;
Jansson in progress). It is a challenging task for future research on non-causal explanations to explore how non-causal ways of explaining in science, mathematics and philosophy interrelate. This project is also a great opportunity for philosophers of science to interact with neighboring field in philosophy.
